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BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE SURVEILLANCE OF ITALIAN
AFFAIRS, 1860–70*
O. J. WR IGHT
Kingston University
A B S T R ACT. During the nineteenth century the British consular service was often dismissed as an
organization with purely commercial responsibilities. A succession of governments and diplomats insisted
upon this notion, despite the fact that at certain times both relied very much on consular oﬃcials for
information on foreign aﬀairs. This dependence was especially evident in Italy during the decade after 1860,
when British leaders had lent their moral and diplomatic support to the creation of the modern Italian state
against considerable international opposition. During this period their desire not to see the achievement
undone led them to maintain a close watch on Italian aﬀairs. The contribution made in this area by the
consular service, and the manner in which it was reorganized in response to Italian uniﬁcation, show how
such a role could take priority over its other functions. Although this state of aﬀairs was no doubt exceptional
on account of the remarkable level of British interest in the Uniﬁcation of Italy, it nonetheless provides a clear
demonstration of how the organization could be used under certain circumstances. The extent to which
British consuls were used to monitor aﬀairs in post-uniﬁcation Italy also encourages reﬂection upon the
widespread view that British foreign policy rejected interventionism in favour of isolation from European
aﬀairs during the 1860s.
The Uniﬁcation of Italy (1859–61) suited the ideology and interests of Victorian
Britain. When British leaders lent their moral and diplomatic support to the
creation of the modern Italian state in 1860, their policy reﬂected the general aim
of exporting Britain’s constitutional model either by inﬂuence or intervention.1
It was also consistent with a considerable British artistic and literary aﬀection
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for Italy,2 and a great popular enthusiasm for Garibaldi and the Italian nationalist
cause.3 The creation of a single Italian kingdom posed no threat to British inter-
ests and oﬀered potential advantages to Britain as a Mediterranean power. Most
research on the British involvement in the Risorgimento has hitherto focused on
the critical phase of Italian uniﬁcation prior to 1861.4 By contrast, little attention
has been paid to the British interest in Italy during the following decade, when
Italian aﬀairs were eclipsed by the American Civil War (1861–5) and the
Uniﬁcation of Germany (by 1871).5 Nonetheless, throughout the 1860s the British
watched developments in Italy closely, especially while it was the policy of Lords
Palmerston and Russell ‘ to see the independence of Italy maintained, and the
peace of Europe preserved’.6 In seeking to realize these objectives the Foreign
Oﬃce relied primarily on the combined eﬀorts of the diplomatic and consular
services for information on Italian aﬀairs.7
Throughout the nineteenth century these two organizations performed
ostensibly diﬀerent functions, resulting in misconceptions concerning their
respective roles. For decades British governments, Foreign Oﬃce staﬀ, and
diplomatic representatives perpetuated the notion that the work of each service
was entirely diﬀerent from that of the other. As a result diplomats tend to be
regarded as implementers of foreign policy, while consuls are normally con-
sidered to have existed for the promotion of trading interests and to attend to the
needs of Britons overseas.8 However, it should be noted that during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries the everyday value of diplomats lay in the
reporting of overseas events rather than in negotiations,9 and that at times of
particular upheaval they would commentate not only on political aﬀairs but also
2 See C. P. Brand, Italy and the English Romantics : the Italianate fashion in early nineteenth-century England
(Cambridge, 1957) ; John Pemble, The Mediterranean passion : Victorians and Edwardians in the south (Oxford,
1987) ; Maura O’Connor, The romance of Italy and the English imagination (Basingstoke, 1998) ; Roderick
Cavaliero, Italia romantica : English Romantics and Italian freedom (London, 2005) ; A. N. Wilson, The
Victorians (London, 2002), pp. 84–92.
3 See Derek Beales, ‘Garibaldi in England: the politics of Italian enthusiasm’, in John A. Davis
and Paul Ginsborg, eds., Society and politics in the age of the Risorgimento (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 184–
216.
4 For example, see Beales, England and Italy ; Mario Tedeschi, Francia e Inghilterra di fronte alla Questione
Romana, 1859–1860 (Milan, 1978) ; Nicholas E. Carter, ‘Sir James Hudson, British diplomacy and the
Italian question: February 1858 to June 1861’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales Cardiﬀ, 1993) ; Nick
Carter, ‘Hudson, Malmesbury and Cavour: British diplomacy and the Italian question, February 1858
to June 1859’, Historical Journal, 40 (1997), pp. 389–413.
5 For rare examples of such work, see H. E. Priestley, ‘British policy in the Italian question,
1866–1871’ (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1931) ; Massimo de Leonardis, L’Inghilterra e la questione Romana
1859–70 (Milan, 1980).
6 Russell to Hudson, 14 Mar. 1862, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FO 170/99.
7 See also Owain James Wright, ‘The information service: British diplomats and consuls in Italy,
1861–1870’ (Ph.D. thesis, Lancaster, 2005).
8 For the oﬃcial responsibilities of consular oﬃcials, see E. W. A. Tuson, The British consul’s manual :
being a practical guide for consuls as well as for the merchant shipowner, and master mariner (London, 1856).
9 Jeremy Black, British diplomats and diplomacy, 1688–1800 (Exeter, 2001), p. 58.
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on social and economic conditions.10 The history of the British consular service
has been relatively neglected by historians, and the contribution it made to the
information-gathering process has been largely overlooked.11 Whereas French
consuls have been recognized as being the ‘eyes and ears ’ of their Foreign
Oﬃce,12 their British counterparts have been dismissed with the assertion that
even though they might ‘occasionally have acted as sources of political intelli-
gence, they were under no obligation to do so’.13 It is the aim of this article to
improve our understanding of the level of co-operation between the diplomatic
and consular services when describing and explaining foreign aﬀairs.
Refreshing approaches have contributed to the resurgence of the study of
British overseas representatives,14 and this work follows a number of others which
have focused on such personalities and their interaction with their host environ-
ments.15 During the nineteenth century dramatic improvements in communi-
cations technology removed the traditional autonomy of diplomats but left their
importance as gatherers of information intact, if not increased.16 Their despatches
served simultaneously as means for the communication of new information as
well as for the storage of old,17 and in preparing them British diplomats in Italy
relied enormously upon a harmonious and eﬀective working relationship with
their consular colleagues. When the service was reorganized in response to Italian
uniﬁcation, its ability to provide intelligence on Italian aﬀairs was prioritized over
its commercial functions. This situation was no doubt exceptional owing to the
level of British interest in Italian uniﬁcation. Nonetheless, it demonstrates how
10 Michael Hughes, ‘British diplomats in Russia on the eve of revolution’, European History Quarterly,
24 (1994), pp. 342–3.
11 The only general history of the British consular service is D. C. M. Platt, The Cinderella service :
British consuls since 1825 (London, 1971). Other works include Lucia Patrizio-Gunning, ‘The British
consular service in the Aegean, 1820–1860’ (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1997) ; G. W. Rice, ‘British consuls
and diplomats in the mid-eighteenth century: an Italian example’, English Historical Review, 92 (1977),
pp. 843–46; D. C. M. Platt, ‘The role of the consular service in overseas trade, 1825–1914’, Economic
History Review, n.s., 15 (1963), pp. 494–512; Peter Byrd, ‘Regional and functional specialisation in the
British consular service’, Journal of Contemporary History, 7 (1972), pp. 127–45; John McDermott, ‘The
Foreign Oﬃce and its German consuls before 1914’, Journal of Modern History, 50, On Demand
Supplement (1978), pp. 1001–34; P. D. Coates, The China consuls : British consular oﬃcers, 1843–1943 (Hong
Kong, 1988). 12 Patrizio-Gunning, The British consular service in the Aegean, pp. 12–13.
13 Platt, The Cinderella service, p. 6.
14 David Reynolds, ‘ International history, the cultural turn and the diplomatic twitch’, Cultural and
Social History, 3 (2006), pp. 75–91. See also Patrick Finney, ‘The diplomatic temptation’, Antony Best,
‘ ‘‘The cultural turn’’ and the international history of East Asia ’, and David Reynolds, ‘Culture,
diplomacy and language’, Cultural and Social History, 3 (2006), pp. 472–95.
15 For example, see Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes : British representative in Japan, 1865–1883
(Richmond, 1996) ; Karina Urbach, Bismarck’s favourite Englishman: the embassy of Odo Russell to Berlin
(London, 1999) ; Scott W. Murray, Liberal diplomacy and German Uniﬁcation : the early career of Robert Morier
(Westport, CT, and London, 2000) ; Katie Hickman, Daughters of Britannia : the lives and times of diplomatic
wives (London, 2000).
16 John Ure, Diplomatic bag : an anthology of diplomatic incidents and anecdotes from the Renaissance to the Gulf
War (London, 1994), p. 5.
17 Like newspapers ; see Daniel R. Headrick,When information came of age : technologies of knowledge in the
age of reason and revolution, 1700–1850 (New York, 2000), p. 5.
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eﬀectively the consular service could be used under certain circumstances. It also
encourages reﬂection upon the view that British foreign policy abandoned inter-
ventionism in favour of isolation from European aﬀairs during the 1860s.
After the proclamation of the kingdom of Italy in 1861 the British prime min-
ister and foreign secretary, respectively Lords Palmerston and Russell, hoped that
the new state’s emergence would resolve the Italian question which had threa-
tened the peace of Europe for decades. They were also anxious to see that the
country’s uniﬁcation would not be undone, either by its enemies or through the
folly of the Italians themselves. Italy had few international friends, and its early
leaders failed to gain any by declaring their intention to complete Italian uniﬁ-
cation by acquiring the still-independent papal state of Rome and Austrian-ruled
Venetia.18 Besides external dangers, Italy also faced massive internal diﬃculties.
Although legitimized by a number of plebiscites and celebrated in Britain as the
realization of a national dream,19 many Italians actually regarded uniﬁcation as
little more than a Piedmontese conquest,20 and in southern Italy and Sicily
widespread opposition precipitated a virtual civil war. During the summer of 1860
Garibaldi’s arrival in Naples had prompted the British envoy Sir Henry Elliot to
predict that ‘ it is by no means impossible that we must be worse before we are
better ’.21 By the winter Odo Russell, Elliot’s colleague in Rome, had noted that
an unlikely alliance of republican radicals and papal reactionaries was conspiring
to oppose Italian uniﬁcation.22 Aware of the internal and external fragility of the
new state, the foreign secretary stressed the importance of his representatives
relaying
full accounts of the temper, condition and prospects, of the various Provinces of which the
proposed new Kingdom is composed … every step taken at Naples [in the unruly south],
and conﬁrmed or overruled at Turin [Italy’s ﬁrst capital], is not merely a matter of great
interest in itself, but has an important bearing on the future welfare of Italy, and the future
Peace of Europe.23
Hence the Foreign Oﬃce sought to use the consular service for the acquisition of
intelligence on conditions and developments in Italy.
To this end, and with a view to alleviating any confusion generated by the
country’s uniﬁcation, a memorandum was despatched to all the British consular
representatives in Italy. It contained a rare acknowledgement of the political side
of their role :
it is the duty of Her Majesty’s Consuls to keep HM’s Representative under whose control
they are placed, fully informed on all matters, political as well as commercial, which may
18 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (London, 1985), pp. 232–3, 260–3.
19 A. J. P. Taylor, The struggle for mastery in Europe (Oxford, 1971), p. 124.
20 Nicholas Doumanis, Inventing the nation : Italy (London, 2001), pp. 86–7.
21 Elliot to Minto, 2 July 1860, Minto papers, National Library of Scotland, MS 12250.
22 Odo Russell to Lord Russell, 30 Dec. 1860, in Noel Blakiston, ed., The Roman question: extracts from
the despatches of Odo Russell from Rome, 1858–1870 (London, 1962), p. 146.
23 Russell to Hudson, 15 Mar. 1861, TTNA, FO 167/122.
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come under their observation, and they should accordingly furnish him, simultaneously
with the despatch of the originals, with copies of all despatches, except merely formal
Returns, which they may address to this Oﬃce.24
In fulﬁlling these instructions the consular service proved enormously valuable to
the diplomats who served as British envoys to Italy during the 1860s. The ﬁrst,
Sir James Hudson (1861–3), had already served in Piedmont since 1852; as the
Uniﬁcation of Italy brought about the aggrandizement of that kingdom, so too
did it increase the scale of his responsibilities. Before 1861 Hudson had been
charged with reporting on the aﬀairs of Piedmont and its island possession of
Sardinia ; thereafter he found himself expected to provide information on events
throughout the whole of Italy. Hudson and his successors, Sir Henry Elliot
(1863–7) and Sir Augustus Paget (1867–83), had to do this while resident in the
cities which served in turn as the seat of the Italian government – Turin (1861–5)
and Florence (1865–71) – before Rome became the capital of Italy in 1871. They
were seldom able to travel away from the British diplomatic legation in order to
see other parts of the country for themselves, and even when able to do so events
could conspire against them. While accompanying King Vittorio Emanuele on a
visit to southern Italy in 1862 Hudson found his journey a valuable opportunity to
see how Tuscany was adapting to Italian uniﬁcation, but was unable to take
similar advantage of his time in Naples after being struck by illness.25 Paget hoped
to gauge the state of public opinion in Turin on the occasion of a royal wedding in
1868, but found his eﬀorts frustrated by his ceremonial duties.26 In 1869 Paget
enjoyed a rail journey through Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy in the company
of the prince and princess of Wales, but found little opportunity to take much
account of the places through which he passed.27 During the 1860s no British
diplomat was able to venture much further south than Naples, or over the sea to
Sardinia or Sicily. The fact that they were usually conﬁned to their cities of
residence has led to their being accused of simply cribbing their reports ‘ straight
from the morning’s newspapers ’.28 Hudson, Elliot and Paget certainly took ad-
vantage of the press, but they also relied on other sources, including foreign
politicians, domestic oﬃcials, travellers, and other acquaintances. However, in
terms of accessibility and reliability none could rival the permanent hierarchy of
British consuls based in Italy, employed by the Foreign Oﬃce, and owing their
allegiance to the crown.
During the eighteenth century British governments had attempted to extend
the consular service in Italy’s predecessor states.29 At the beginning of the nine-
teenth century British merchants had called for its expansion in order to exploit
24 See enclosure in Hammond (for Russell) to Hudson, 2 May 1861, TNA, FO 45/1.
25 Hudson to Russell, 27 May 1862, Russell papers (hereafter RP), TNA, PRO 30/22/69.
26 Paget to Stanley, 25 Apr. 1868, TTNA, FO 45/125.
27 Paget to Clarendon, 6 May 1869, TTNA, FO 45/141.
28 Martin Clark, Modern Italy, 1871–1995 (2nd edn, London, 1996), p. 7.
29 Rice, ‘British consuls and diplomats’, pp. 834–46.
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Italy’s developing markets.30 By 1861 the service was more extensive in Italy than
in any other part of the world, with the exception of the Ottoman empire.
Signiﬁcant consular oﬃces existed at Milan, Genoa, Massa Carrara, Livorno,
Naples, Palermo, and Cagliari. There were also posts at Venice, which was ceded
to Italy in 1866, and at Rome and Civitavecchia, which were occupied by the
Italians in 1870. Within a few years the oﬃces at Milan and Massa Carrara were
closed, while signiﬁcant new posts were created at Turin and Brindisi. In addition
to these, there existed many small vice-consulates throughout the country. The
conventional post and the novelty of the telegraph ensured that British diplomats
had good communications links with the occupants of these oﬃces, who could be
requested to provide them with information on any matter within their consular
district. By being of British birth, or Italians who had sworn an oath of allegiance,
consuls could reasonably be relied upon to provide intelligence regardless of its
strategic importance or its potential to embarrass their host government.
For example, in both 1862 and 1867 Garibaldi and his volunteers attempted to
conquer Rome for Italy, acting to some degree in collusion with the king and his
premier, Rattazzi.31 On both occasions the British government gained advance
warning of these potentially explosive events courtesy of the zealous British consul
at Genoa, Montagu Brown. During the 1850s Genoa had developed a reputation
as a centre for the democratic movement in Italy,32 and when a meeting of Italian
nationalists and revolutionaries took place in the city in 1862 Brown exceeded
his commercial brief by some margin. Apparently ﬁnding details easy to come by,
he provided Hudson with frequent accounts of the proceedings, warned of the
revolutionary committee’s intention to extend ‘throughout the whole of Italy
its sphere of action’, and suggested that it posed a considerable threat to the
tranquillity of the new state.33 Brown claimed to have used every means in his
power to obtain accurate information, and his apprehension was transferred to
the Foreign Oﬃce when Hudson highlighted the potential danger of these events
in a city bursting ‘with the restless spirits of all Italy ’.34 Once Garibaldi and his
volunteers had sailed for Sicily, abandoning their original intention of attacking
Austria in favour of marching on Rome, British attention was transferred ac-
cordingly. Throughout the crisis the British consuls in the island followed the
volunteers’ movements closely. From Livorno in Tuscany and Ancona in Marche
Consul Alexander Macbean and Vice-Consul Gustavus Gaggiotti reported
respectively that large numbers of young men were converging on those ports in
30 John Jackson, Reﬂections on the commerce of the Mediterranean: deduced from actual experience during a
residence on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea (London, 1804), p. 110.
31 Denis Mack Smith, Italy and its monarchy (New Haven, CT, and London, 1989), p. 13.
32 Clara M. Lovett, The democratic movement in Italy, 1830–1876 (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1982),
p. 175.
33 Brown to Hudson, 10 Mar. 1862, copy in Hudson to Russell, 11 Mar. 1862, Brown to Hudson,
11 Mar. 1862, extract in Hudson to Russell, 12 Mar. 1862, and Brown to Hudson, 12 Mar. 1862, copy in
Hudson to Russell, 14 Mar. 1862, all TNA, FO 45/22.
34 Hudson to Russell, 14 Mar. 1862, TNA, FO 45/22.
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the hope of sailing to join Garibaldi.35 The British consul at Palermo, John
Goodwin, followed the development of the volunteer force and gave frequent
accounts of its progress through the island. Goodwin also commented upon the
local authorities’ eﬀorts to prevent the publication of Garibaldian propaganda
and to impede the campaign,36 and was ably assisted by the British vice-consuls in
the island.37 Eventually Garibaldi sailed to Aspromonte in Calabria unchecked by
the navy, but his force was defeated by a division of bersaglieri sent by an Italian
government which had lost its nerve and bowed to international pressure.38 The
fact that the British government was kept so well informed of these events was
largely the achievement of its consuls. It was understandably able to obtain little
information from Rattazzi’s administration, and although the most important
incidents were covered in Britain by The Times – such as a speech in which
Garibaldi condemned the French emperor and the pope, and called for the
forceful liberation of Rome and Venetia – this was usually only several days after
the event.39 By contrast, British consuls would relate aﬀairs in detail as a matter of
routine,40 and particularly urgent matters would be reported by telegraph so that
the news would be received within hours.
There is an interesting contrast between the eﬃciency with which the consular
service provided accurate and detailed information for the British legation to
Italy during Garibaldi’s campaign of 1862 and his ﬁnal attempt to complete the
Uniﬁcation of Italy in 1867. While Garibaldi was again preparing his volunteer
force in Genoa the British legation was once more well informed by Consul
Brown. But on this occasion Garibaldi’s plan of marching on Rome from the
north ensured that the action took place in a vast swathe of territory where there
were few British consular oﬃces. Consequently once the campaign was underway
Paget found it diﬃcult to follow events from his post in Florence, despite actually
being much closer to the scene of events near Rome than Hudson had been
during the earlier campaign in Sicily. The only British consuls stationed in
the region were those in Civitavecchia and Rome itself, and although they
did communicate with the British legation their relationship with Paget was
enigmatic owing to their location in the independent papal state. The fact that
they were not obliged to communicate with him as a matter of routine caused
some confusion,41 and oﬃcially Paget was left to rely on whatever information the
Italian government – once again under Rattazzi – would share with him.42 And
35 Macbean to Hudson, 20 July 1862 and 2 Aug. 1862, copies in Hudson to Russell, 2 Aug. 1862,
TNA, FO 45/25; Gaggiotti to Hudson, 4 Aug. 1862, copy in Hudson to Russell, 8 Aug. 1862, TNA,
FO 45/25. 36 Hudson to Russell, 7 Aug. 1862, TNA, FO 45/25.
37 Rickards to Hudson, 4 Aug. 1862, copy in Hudson to Russell, 8 Aug. 1862, TNA, FO 45/25.
38 George Martin, The red shirt and the cross of savoy : the story of Italy’s Risorgimento, 1748–1871 (London,
1969), p. 664. 39 Times, 17 July 1862.
40 Goodwin to Hudson, 6 July 1862, copy in Hudson to Russell, 12 July 1862, TNA, FO 45/24.
41 Paget to Stanley, by telegraph, 25 Oct. 1867, TNA, FO 45/108.
42 Paget to Stanley, 13 Oct. 1867, TNA, FO 45/107.
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on this occasion he did have to resort to cribbing reports from the Italian news-
papers.43
The provision of information by members of the consular service might not
have determined the underlying principles of British foreign policy, but it could
certainly prompt government action. Without the eﬀorts of the British consuls in
Italy, such a quick and detailed understanding of the situation is not likely to have
been formed in London. In response to the news of the meeting at Genoa prior to
the Garibaldian expedition of 1862, Lord Russell ordered Hudson to insist that
Rattazzi ‘keep his eye upon these men’ and ensure that they were not permitted
‘ to invade other Countries ’.44 Although Russell lamented that a promise
from Rattazzi’s government ‘would not be worth a pinch of snuﬀ’,45 his eﬀorts
succeeded in securing an Italian undertaking that everything would be done to
prevent the volunteers’ embarkation.46 Such clandestine activities had played a
vital part in the Uniﬁcation of Italy, and had been exploited by the government
of Count Cavour.47 Palmerston and Russell were well aware of this fact, and
had sought to achieve peaceful settlements to both the Roman and Venetian
questions in 1861.48 In 1862 the news from Italy spurred them into renewing
their eﬀorts by approaching the French and Austrian governments on the subject,
emphasizing the danger posed by the nationalists, and stressing the mutual
advantages of ﬁnding an amicable solution to each problem.49 Their failure to see
these questions resolved resulted in Italy suﬀering the humiliation of having to
halt its national hero at Aspromonte in 1862, and drove the Italians into alliance
with Prussia and war against Austria in 1866. During the build-up to this conﬂict,
the pattern of British action in the Garibaldian campaign was repeated. The new
foreign secretary, Lord Clarendon, was furnished with a sound understanding
of the greatly excited state of Italian public opinion by British representatives
in Italy which persuaded him to lecture the Italian government on the likely perils
of its sabre-rattling.50 His knowledge of Italy’s domestic problems led him to
suggest that before threatening the international peace in pursuit of such aims, the
Italians would do well to concentrate on setting their own ‘house in order ’.51
His awareness of the futility of such eﬀorts in Italy, owing to the determination of
the Italian government to strike a blow against Austria in deference to public
43 See Paget to Stanley, 16, 18, 19, and 20 Oct. 1867, TNA, FO 45/107.
44 Russell to Hudson, 17 Mar. 1862, TNA, FO 170/99; Russell to Hudson, 7 May 1862, TNA, FO
170/100.
45 Russell to Bloomﬁeld, 5 Mar. 1861, in Noel Blakiston, ed., Il problema veneto e l’Europa, 1859–1866,
II : Inghilterra (Venice, 1966), p. 560. 46 Hudson to Russell, 25 Mar. 1862, TNA, FO 45/22.
47 Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, The Risorgimento and the Uniﬁcation of Italy (2nd edn, Harlow,
2002), p. 127.
48 Ivan Scott, The Roman question and the powers, 1848–1865 (The Hague, 1969), pp. 223–52; Frank
J. Coppa, The origins of the Italian wars of independence (London and New York, NY, 1992), p. 115.
49 Russell to Cowley, 17 Mar. and 19 Mar. 1862, Fane to Russell, 14 May 1862, and Bloomﬁeld to
Russell, 15 May 1862, in Blakiston, ed., Il problema veneto, pp. 566, 568, 578–80.
50 Elliot to Clarendon, 3 May 1866, TNA, FO 45/86.
51 Clarendon to Elliot, 23 Apr. 1866, Bodleian Library, Clarendon papers, MS Clar. dep. c. 143.
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opinion in the country, led him into trying to deprive the Italians of their motive
by pursuing the peaceful cession of Venetia in Vienna.52 It is unlikely that such
British action would have been attempted, or at least not in the manner in which
it was pursued, had the Foreign Oﬃce not been so well informed of the state of
aﬀairs in Italy.
The level of eﬃciency with which the consular hierarchy could meet the de-
mands of British diplomats is clear in the action taken by Elliot following the
announcement of the September Convention in 1864. This agreement was in-
tended as a temporary solution to the Roman question, by which the French
promised to end their military protection of the pope on the condition that the
Italians settle upon Florence as an alternative capital. The residents of Turin
reacted violently to the announcement, their demonstrations resulting in a tragic
massacre when nervous carabinieri opened ﬁre on the crowd. Amidst the dis-
turbances Elliot sent a circular telegram to each of the main consulates in Italy,
enquiring as to how the news had been received. The responses were prompt and
provided a clear impression of the state of public opinion throughout the country,
revealing the unpopularity of the Piedmontese domination of Italy.53 From
Naples Consul-General Bonham reported that some people believed their city
should have been considered as a potential capital, although they approved of
Florence as a more central location, and hoped that its elevation might alleviate
their animosity towards the Piedmontese.54 In Tuscany Consul Macbean ob-
served that many people considered the news ‘ too good to be true ’, not because
of the promotion of Florence, but rather on account of their disapproval of how
Italy had been ‘Piedmontized’ rather than Italianized.55 From Vice-Consul
Gaggiotti in Ancona Elliot learnt that the people of the Marche region entirely
disapproved of the rioting in Turin and were ‘anything but pleased ’ with the
Piedmontese predominance.56 From Genoa, the volatile centre of Italian revol-
utionary activities and a city which had not welcomed its own absorption by
Piedmont in 1815,57 Consul Brown explained how the news excited interest
without giving rise to any public disorder. The choice of Florence as a temporary
capital was regarded with ‘great indiﬀerence’, although the Turinese were con-
sidered to have shown ‘a paltry and selﬁsh spirit ’ in their demonstrations.58 In
Sardinia, which had been ruled by the Piedmontese since 1720, Consul William
Craig observed that the people of Cagliari approved ‘cordially ’ of the September
Convention; the privileged viewed it as ‘an important advance’ towards Italy’s
52 Bloomﬁeld to Clarendon, 12 Apr. 1866, Russell to Apponyi, 16 Apr. 1866 and 3 May 1866, in
Blakiston, ed., Il problema veneto, pp. 800, 805–6, 850.
53 Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
54 Bonham to Elliot, 26 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
55 Macbean to Elliot, 27 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
56 Gaggiotti to Elliot, 26 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
57 Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age of Risorgimento, 1790–1870 (London and New York, NY, 1983),
pp. 53–4.
58 Brown to Elliot, 26 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
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ambition of acquiring Rome, while the poor rejoiced ‘at the prospect of being
emancipated’ from Turin. Craig observed that ‘ the Sardes [sic] never re-
ciprocated any very friendly feeling’ with the Piedmontese, and believed that the
Italian government needed to reverse Turin’s appearance of having conquered
Italy by showing ‘Italy as having conquered Turin ’.59 From unruly Sicily
Goodwin reported that there was ‘ ill-blood’ between the Turinese and the
Palermitans, and that the news raised hopes of a change in government policy
towards the island.60 Interestingly Joseph Rickards, the vice-consul at Messina,
pre-empted Elliot’s request for information by writing of a ‘ joyful demonstration ’
in the public gardens and of a band marching through the streets playing patriotic
anthems.61 Upon receiving Elliot’s instructions he elaborated upon this, promis-
ing to keep the British legation ‘accurately and regularly informed of the state of
public feeling’ in his consular district.62
While some consuls reported the public reaction to the news in greater detail
than others, all did so without questioning or neglecting their responsibility to
do so. Indeed, consuls in southern Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily had already proved
particularly eﬀective in providing the British legation and government with in-
formation on events in the most remote parts of Italy. Soon after their endorse-
ment of the Uniﬁcation of Italy in 1860 British leaders had looked to Sardinia in
the hope of anticipating how southern Italy and Sicily might adapt to rule from
the north. Russell ordered a report on how the island had adapted to consti-
tutional government since its voluntary but controversial administrative and
legal fusion with Piedmont in 1847.63 In response Consul Craig produced a very
extensive paper on the social and economic conditions of the island, observing
that the government had ‘not been backward’ in attempting to ameliorate its
‘moral and social condition’.64 Around the same time Goodwin had also been
asked to provide an account of the eﬀorts made by the Italian government in
Sicily after uniﬁcation, including details of public works schemes being under-
taken in order to rebuild Palermo after Garibaldi’s expedition and in order to
reconcile the Sicilians to Italian rule.65 Both oﬃcials were assets to the Foreign
Oﬃce owing to their possession of enormous personal experience of each island.
Craig had lived in Sardinia since 1818, when the island had possessed ‘not a single
carriage road’, and had been the consul at Cagliari since 1846; Goodwin had
been appointed to Palermo in 1834. Such longevity was commonplace in the
59 Craig to Elliot, 3 Oct. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
60 Goodwin to Elliot, 27 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
61 Rickards to Elliot, 24 Sept. 1864, extract in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
62 Rickards to Elliot, 26 Sept. 1864, copy in Elliot to Russell, 4 Oct. 1864, TNA, FO 45/59.
63 See Giancarlo Sorgia, ed., La Sardegna nel 1848: la polemica sulla ‘ fusione ’ (Cagliari, 1968) ; Francesco
Floris, Storia della Sardegna (3rd edn, Rome, 2004), pp. 483–6.
64 William Craig, ‘The island of Sardinia absolute and constitutional brieﬂy compared’, 22 Oct.
1861, in Hudson to Russell, 2 Nov. 1861, TNA, FO 45/9. Craig recorded Russell’s original request as
dated from 29 Apr. 1861.
65 Goodwin to Hudson, 3 Oct. 1861, copy in Hudson to Russell, 11 Oct. 1861, TNA, FO 45/9.
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consular service but unmatched in the diplomatic, where appointees seldom re-
mained in the same post for a decade or more. Such lengthy periods of tenure not
only eminently qualiﬁed many consuls for providing information on local aﬀairs,
but also enabled them to set events in context. Even where they had not been
resident for very long, professional consuls could still prove adept at collating
information on political, social, and economic matters ; in 1869 Consul Colnaghi,
a relatively recent appointment at Turin, provided detailed information on land
tenure and economic conditions in Piedmont.66
In addition to this ability to provide and explain information on a wide range of
matters, such consuls could be expected to aﬀord the British legation and
government an interpretation of events which could not necessarily be expected
from the Italian authorities. As early as 1861 Goodwin had reported from
Palermo that a Bourbon counterrevolution was being attempted in the island,
making the perceptive prediction that it would fail not through the Sicilians’
loyalty to their new Italian rulers but rather because of their preference for
independence from the mainland.67 On the occasion of a royal visit in 1864, the
Italian government declared itself satisﬁed with the reception of Prince Umberto
by the Sicilians, although British consuls in both Palermo and Messina recorded
that it was in fact ‘very cold ’.68 Similarly, when the king visited Naples in 1869
Consul-General Bonham reported that the Neapolitans were not enthusiastic in
their welcome.69 Most strikingly, when a major revolt occurred at Palermo in
1866 the Italian government attempted to maintain that it was not politically
motivated, but the British knew otherwise. The perpetrators were an unlikely
alliance of radical insurgents, clerical reactionaries, and people the authorities
deﬁned as ‘brigands ’ – impoverished peasants, escaped prisoners, army deserters,
former Bourbon employees, and Sicilian autonomists. They overthrew the local
administration and established a provisional government before Italian forces
arrived from the mainland to restore control.70 When Elliot questioned the Italian
premier Ricasoli on the matter, he found that the oﬃcial line in the Italian capital
was to deny that the revolt was in any way political. Even in his instructions to
General Cadorna, who led the Italian military campaign and who was himself
convinced of the political motives behind the revolt, Ricasoli insisted that there
were ‘no political crimes in the Palermo events ’.71 By contrast Goodwin, who saw
the events for himself after being awoken one morning by the sound of gunﬁre,
explained that the perpetrators included clerical and reactionary insurgents
bearing images of saints as well as radicals who hoisted a large red ﬂag in the city
centre. After hearing radical and reactionary cries alongside one another
66 See Colnaghi’s enclosure in Paget to Clarendon, 22 Feb. 1870, TNA, FO45/161.
67 Hudson to Russell, 30 Mar. 1861, TNA, FO 45/5.
68 Elliot to Russell, 18 Mar. 1864, TNA, FO 45/56.
69 Bonham to Paget, 2 Feb. 1869, copy included in Paget to Clarendon, 4 Feb. 1869, TNA, FO
45/139.
70 Lucy Riall, Sicily and the Uniﬁcation of Italy : liberal policy and local power, 1859–1866 (Oxford, 1998),
pp. 198–9. 71 Ibid., pp. 204–5.
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Goodwin concluded that the rising was indicative of the general Sicilian
hostility to Italian rule.72 Elliot understood this as the natural result of the ‘ in-
justice ’ and ‘spoliation’ forced on the island by the Italian government’s policy of
‘Piedmontization’ irrespective of the wishes of the people, and shrewdly observed
that the islanders remained Sicilian before they were Italian.73 In this way
Goodwin demonstrated his value to a Foreign Oﬃce which Lionel Sackville
West, the secretary of the British legation to Italy, had recommended to dispense
with his services on account of his commercial reports being ‘virtually useless ’.74
Throughout the nineteenth century the quality of British consular personnel
varied enormously. In 1825 the service was taken out of private hands and placed
under government control in an eﬀort to improve its utility. Despite frequent calls
to professionalize it, including the recommendations of three parliamentary select
committees,75 the reluctance of successive governments to commit to the expense
of reform ensured that it remained only a semi-professional organization. In
comparison with its diplomatic counterpart the consular service was hampered by
poor prestige; Disraeli described it as a ‘refuge for the destitute ’ and the least-
promising oﬀspring of any notable family.76 A strict ﬁscal regime imposed by
the treasury ensured that consular salaries were relatively low and that most
vice-consuls received no salary at all. Consequently many recruits were native
residents or expatriates with their own private income, who took on the work in
return for whatever prestige or other kinds of ﬁnancial gain it might yield. This
led to frequent debates over whether or not the government should insist upon
appointing oﬃcials who were of British nationality,77 and whether or not its
personnel should be permitted to engage in trade.78 The service also lacked a rigid
hierarchy, and the fact that appointments were made ultimately at the discretion
of the foreign secretary ensured that there was no guarantee either seniority or
merit would be rewarded.79
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the consular service strug-
gled to attract suitable personnel, and that some appointments were wholly
inappropriate. In 1858 a post was created at La Spezia for Charles Lever, whose
qualiﬁcations included a fashionable literary reputation and connections in the
Conservative party ; revealingly, Lever had asked to be appointed to Naples but
was considered unsuitable for such an important post.80 He repaid his employers’
72 John Goodwin, ‘Seven days of disturbance in Palermo’, 9 Oct. 1866, copy in Elliot to Stanley,
13 Oct. 1866, TNA, FO 45/90. 73 Elliot to Stanley, 22 Sept. 1866, TNA, FO 45/89.
74 Lionel Sackville West, ‘Remarks upon the consular service in Italy ’, in Hudson to Russell, 1 July
1862, TNA, FO 45/24.
75 See Report of the select committee on consular establishment, Parliamentary Papers (hereafter PP) 1835 VI ;
Report from the select committee on consular service and appointments, PP 1857–8 VIII ; Report of the select committee on
the diplomatic and consular services, PP 1872 VII.
76 Platt, ‘The role of the consular service in overseas trade, 1825–1914’, p. 497.
77 For each side of the argument see Jackson, Reﬂections on the commerce of the Mediterranean, p. 41, and
Tuson, The British consul’s manual, pp. 6–7. 78 Platt, The Cinderella service, pp. 15, 31, 37.
79 Ibid., pp. 49, 51. 80 Noel Blakiston, Inglesi e Italiani nel Risorgimento (Catania, 1973), p. 43.
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generosity by spending lengthy periods absent without leave, or sailing around
the bay in the hope of irritating his French counterpart.81 In the still-independent
city of Rome Joseph Severn oﬀended the papal authorities by decorating his
consulate with the Italian tricolore ; the resident British diplomat Odo Russell de-
scribed the ageing artist as ‘utterly unﬁt and unqualiﬁed for his post ’.82 In Livorno
the competent Consul Macbean’s business as a merchant prevented him from
attending his oﬃce before the afternoon and soured his relationship with the
British community which he was appointed to serve.83 The fact that such men
remained in oﬃce is perhaps indicative of the premium placed on their role as
observers of Italian aﬀairs rather than on their commercial responsibilities. In
Palermo and Livorno Goodwin and Macbean each proved their worth in this
respect ; the post at La Spezia was not of suﬃcient political importance to justify
removing Lever, while in Rome Severn’s political responsibilities were minimized
by the presence of Odo Russell.84
Of course, if events dictated that the British government should maintain
a close watch on any particular location, the Foreign Oﬃce could ensure the
appointment of an individual with the appropriate skills and experience. When
uniﬁcation necessitated the reorganization of the consular service in Italy, the
ability of consuls to act as collectors of political intelligence took priority over their
traditional commercial role. When a new consulate-general was opened at Milan
in 1860, the Foreign Oﬃce created a post which was rare in Europe; such
prestigious and expensive oﬃces were more frequently used elsewhere in the
world in the place of diplomatic missions. A consul-general would be expected to
communicate directly with the Foreign Oﬃce (as opposed to doing so through a
diplomatic representative) on a more regular basis than an ordinary consul.
During the 1850s and 1860s a number of consulates-general were used to collect
information on political aﬀairs in pre-uniﬁcation Germany, and it has been
suggested that the oﬃce in Milan was opened in order to monitor developments
in Lombardy after its passage from Austrian to Piedmontese rule.85 This is
supported by the fact that although there was seldom any occurrence of trans-
ferral of personnel between the diplomatic and consular professions, the new
consul-general Loftus Otway was a former diplomat rather than a consul.86 This
exceptional appointment suggests that in Milan the commercial experience of
a consul was not required so much as the ability to comment on political aﬀairs
more associated with a diplomat. Furthermore, the oﬃce was closed again on
81 Hudson to Russell, 4 Oct. 1862, RP, TNA, PRO 30/22/69.
82 Blakiston, ed., The Roman question, p. xix.
83 Sackville West’s ‘Remarks upon the consular service in Italy ’, in Hudson to Russell, 1 July 1862,
TNA, FO 45/24.
84 For Russell’s role, see Blakiston, ed., The Roman question ; Urbach, Bismarck’s favourite Englishman,
pp. 34–9. 85 Platt, The Cinderella service, p. 18.
86 Otway had held high diplomatic posts in Spain and Mexico; Foreign oﬃce list (London, Jan. 1861),
p. 119.
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Otway’s death after a mere eighteen months of operation.87 By that time Milan
was quite peaceful, and the excitement in Italian aﬀairs had shifted towards
Naples, and southern resistance to northern rule. Similarly the costly British
consulate-general in Venice was closed in 1872, after the city had passed from
Austrian to Italian rule and ceased to be a centre of international intrigue, but
despite having lost none of its commercial importance or popularity with British
visitors.
As the British consular presence was reduced in areas of relative tranquillity, it
was increased where there was turmoil. The closure of the high-ranking oﬃce
in Milan was followed promptly by the elevation of the existing consulate
at Naples to the status of a consulate-general. Although this move has been ex-
plained as a reward for the long-serving Edward Bonham,88 such promotions
were very unusual under the strict ﬁscal regime then prevailing at the Foreign
Oﬃce. Moreover, it cannot be a coincidence that the decision was taken soon
after the famous expedition of Garibaldi and the Thousand in 1860 had eﬀec-
tively imposed upon Naples a fate similar to that which would be inﬂicted upon
Turin by the September Convention after 1864 – demotion from a state capital to
a regional city. Prior to uniﬁcation there had been widespread anticipation in
northern Italy that the south was a land rich with resources, and considering
the way in which Piedmont had prospered under the constitutional rule of
Cavour during the 1850s,89 it was reasonable to assume that the extension of that
government to southern Italy would make it prosperous.90 It was only as the
Piedmontese attempted to extend their administration through southern Italy
and Sicily that this hope was destroyed by the discovery of the horriﬁc reality
of the south,91 a land and people which to them seemed more African than
European.92 The poverty and corruption of Italy’s most remote territories, their
often mountainous terrain, their poor communications infrastructures, and
their variety of incomprehensible dialects all complicated the task of assimilating
them into the new Italian state.93 The Piedmontese quickly lost patience and
sought to establish their authority over the south by increasingly brutal means,
and a virtual civil war dragged on until 1865. Both the rejection of northern
rule by the southern population and the harsh repression to which the Italian
authorities were forced to resort were profoundly embarrassing to the country’s
new liberal leaders, who could hardly be relied upon to share the details of either
87 Hammond (for Russell) to Reynolds, 11 Oct. 1861, copy included in Reynolds to Hudson, 14 Oct.
1861, TNA, FO 167/125. 88 Platt, The Cinderella service, p. 61.
89 See A. Scirocco, L’Italia del Risorgimento, 1800–1860 (Bologna, 1990), pp. 315–66.
90 Roger Absalom, Italy since 1800: a nation in the balance? (London and New York, NY, 1995), p. 47.
91 John Dickie, ‘Stereotypes of the Italian south’, in R. Lumley and J. Morris, eds., The new history of
the Italian south : the Mezzogiorno revisited (Exeter, 1997), 122.
92 Nelson Moe, The view from Vesuvius : Italian culture and the southern question (Berkeley, CA, 2002),
pp. 162–8.
93 See L. J. Riall, ‘Liberal policy and the control of public order in western Sicily, 1860–1862’,
Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 345–68.
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with British representatives. As the senior British oﬃcial in southern Italy
following the closure of the diplomatic legation in Naples in 1860, Bonham bore
the greatest responsibility for monitoring these aﬀairs. As a consul-general he
could be relied upon to preside over the hierarchy of consular oﬃcers in southern
Italy and to communicate directly with the Foreign Oﬃce in London as well as
with the British diplomatic mission in Turin.
The eagerness with which British leaders aimed to follow these events is further
indicated by the fact that, in addition to Bonham’s promotion, three diplomatic
representatives were enlisted brieﬂy as special observers in the south. Early
in 1861 the foreign secretary engaged the services of Peter Browne, a retired
diplomat resident in Naples, to correspond privately with him on aﬀairs in the
former Bourbon capital.94 At around the same time Dudley Saurin, an attache´
normally aﬃliated to the British legation in Turin, was sent to Naples to take
charge of the archives of the erstwhile diplomatic oﬃce in the city. However, the
real motive for the young attache´’s sojourn might well have been quite diﬀerent,
as particular use was made of his presence to obtain information on an unpleasant
incident in Abruzzo, a region which saw some of the worst disorder in Italy and
which possessed not a single British consular oﬃce. When an alliance of rebels led
by a notorious local brigand seized a small town near Foggia, it was presumably
the reluctance of Italian oﬃcials to share accurate intelligence on the embar-
rassing episode which prompted Saurin to travel there in order to cover the event.
Although the bersaglieri managed to defeat the rebels, Saurin found that the
new state faced ‘ incalculable ’ diﬃculties in the region, owing to its ‘hopeless
demoralization’, the corruption of its ruling elite and legal system, insuﬃcient
numbers of carabinieri, and the fact that its population did not ‘care for the Italian
cause ’.95 Subsequently the foreign secretary despatched the young diplomat
Laurence Oliphant upon an Italian tour which concentrated on such unruly and
remote regions as the Abruzzo, Russell emphasizing his desire for ‘accurate in-
formation’ on their conditions and the state of public opinion.96 When Bonham
described Italy’s southern provinces as still being in an ‘alarming state ’ in 1866,
by which time Browne, Saurin, and Oliphant had all departed, Elliot acknowl-
edged that the consul-general was in the best position from which to judge.97
However, nowhere is there stronger evidence of the British government’s
determination to use its consular service in Italy for the purpose of gathering
political intelligence than in the contrasting cases of Florence and Turin. When
Tuscany was annexed to Piedmont in 1859, it experienced a far more peaceful
transition to Piedmontese rule than southern Italy after 1861. When the diplo-
matic corps departed from Florence the Foreign Oﬃce determined that no
consular presence would be required in its place. For a short period Henry
94 For Browne’s private letters presented as oﬃcial despatches see RP, TNA, PRO 30/22/72.
95 Saurin to Hudson, 12 June 1861, in Papers respecting the aﬀairs of southern Italy, PP 1861 LXVII 375,
pp. 25–7. 96 Hudson to Russell, 20 May 1862, TNA, FO 45/23.
97 Elliot to Russell, c. 22 June 1866, TNA, FO 45/87.
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Fenton, an attache´ aﬃliated to the former British legation, remained in order
to report on its aﬀairs and ‘to be of service to English travellers and residents
who may require assistance’.98 The move might well be considered to have
prioritized the task of observation rather than attending the needs of the many
British residents and visitors to Florence; Fenton was removed as soon as the
city was peacefully assimilated into the Italian state,99 regardless of the fact that
its diminished political importance did not alter the size of its British community.
As a result of the subsequent lack of British representation in Florence the foreign
secretary received a petition of eighty signatures, forwarded by Hudson, who
urged him to appoint an agent ‘ to protect British interests in that city ’.100
The petitioners suggested that the Foreign Oﬃce was aware of the need for
representation in Florence, having declared the consul at Livorno to be respon-
sible for their needs. But despite the fact that Livorno lay some distance away, and
regardless of Consul Macbean’s recommendations that another consulate should
be opened to take pressure oﬀ his own post,101 the foreign secretary insisted that
there was ‘no suﬃcient reason on public grounds for the appointment of a British
agent at Florence’.102 Hudson wrote a further request for the extension of
consular representation to the city, predicting that it would increase in import-
ance owing to its location on the new Italian rail network.103 Only in 1863
did Russell ﬁnally acquiesce by appointing Charles Proby as an unsalaried vice-
consul in Florence.104 Clearly the government was not interested in appointing
a representative for the mundane purpose of attending to the needs of the large
expatriate community and high numbers of British visitors in the peaceful city.
When the same problem occurred again in Turin upon the transfer of the
Italian government to Florence in 1865, the British government’s behaviour was
strikingly diﬀerent. With the whole of northern Italy rendered devoid of any form
of British representation except for the consulate at Genoa and a number of small
vice-consulates, the government recognized immediately that there was a need to
establish a new consular oﬃce in either Turin or Milan. Although neither city
attracted British visitors to their art and architecture in the same manner as other
Italian cities, their location near the Alpine passes made them popular stopovers
for travellers entering the peninsula. More importantly, they were two of the most
important ﬁnancial centres in Italy,105 and their signiﬁcance in both respects
seemed set to rise with the impending completion of the Mont Cenis railway,
98 Russell to Hudson, 17 Apr. 1860, TNA, FO 167/112.
99 Foreign Oﬃce list (Jan. 1861), p. 81.
100 Petition dated 12 Feb. 1861, and enclosed in Hudson to Russell, 18 Feb. 1861, FO 45/4.
101 Macbean to Hudson, 20 Oct. 1860, and 16 Nov. 1860, TNA, FO 167/119.
102 Russell to Hudson, draft copy, 28 Feb. 1861, TNA, FO 45/1.
103 Hudson to Russell, 18 Oct. 1861, TNA, FO 45/9.
104 Proby was appointed on 1 May 1863 and remained in oﬃce until the Italian government was
moved to Florence in 1865. Foreign Oﬃce list (Jan. 1870), p. 150.
105 Gianni Toniolo, An economic history of liberal Italy, 1850–1918 (London and New York, NY, 1990),
p. 58.
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which would soon enable direct rail travel between Paris and Turin.106 However,
when it came to choosing to locate the new oﬃce in either Turin or Milan, the
selection was apparently determined by political considerations.
The decision to establish the new oﬃce was made on Elliot’s recommendation.
When the diplomat warned that Britons were likely to experience inconvenience
‘by the want of any Consular Agent in the North of Italy ’,107 he stipulated that
the new appointee ought to be an experienced professional consul, rather than a
British resident or local merchant appointed to serve as an unsalaried vice-consul.
The Foreign Oﬃce responded by creating a relatively well-paid consular post,108
and by appointing the professional Dominic Colnaghi who had several years’
experience of service in Greece. What is most revealing is that despite acknowl-
edging Milan’s greater commercial importance and its higher volume of British
travellers, Elliot insisted that the new consulate should be established in Turin,
and that his opinion prevailed over that of the new foreign secretary Lord
Clarendon. Elliot’s choice shows that such considerations were of lesser import-
ance than the desirability of maintaining an observer of political aﬀairs in
Piedmont. While the Uniﬁcation of Italy was still widely perceived in Britain as
the outcome of a popular movement, Elliot had been serving as a special envoy
in Naples at the time of Garibaldi’s arrival in 1860, and was well aware that
many people had not welcomed it. After the September Convention had brought
violence and tragedy to the streets of Turin in 1864, Elliot had arrived on the
scene within minutes and appears to have been quite aﬀected by the sight of
the corpses. Thereafter he remained very much alive to the ‘ ill-humour’ of the
Turinese over the alleged subordination of their interests to those of the rest
of Italy.109 He also witnessed other public shows of disapprobation, such as the
stoning of the royal carriage and disrespectful behaviour towards the king during
his visit to the theatre on New Year’s Day 1865.110 Upon his departure for
Florence he noted the mutual regret of people and king at the departure of
the government, and suggested that Turin had been hit hard by the loss of its
status.111 The way in which the demotion of Naples had caused resentment and
dragged the city and its hinterland into ﬁnancial decline after 1860 set a worrying
precedent, and Elliot was driven to describe Turin as a ‘dying capital ’.112 For
these reasons the diplomat insisted that even though Milan would be a more
suitable location for a consulate under normal circumstances, it would be in the
British interest to maintain Colnaghi in Turin as an informant on events and the
state of public opinion in the city.
106 Pemble, The Mediterranean passion, pp. 26–7.
107 Elliot to Russell, 27 Apr. 1865, TNA, FO 45/71.
108 The salary was set at £500 per annum, with an expenses allowance of £150. Foreign Oﬃce list
(Jan. 1870), p. 197.
109 H. G. Elliot, Some revolutions and other diplomatic experiences (London, 1922), pp. 171–9.
110 Elliot to Russell, by telegraph, 2 Jan. 1862; Elliot to Russell, 6 Jan. 1865, TNA, FO 45/70.
111 Elliot to Russell, 9 Feb. 1865, RP, TNA, PRO 30/22/70.
112 Elliot to Russell, 26 Apr. 1865, RP, TNA, PRO 30/22/70.
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Within months of Colnaghi’s arrival in Turin in 1866, the foreign secretary
sought to relocate his oﬃce to Milan. Again Elliot resisted Clarendon’s preference
for the Lombard city, stressing that there existed ‘a considerable party ’ of dis-
contented people in Turin which could ‘at any time become a matter of extreme
interest ’.113 Elliot insisted that ‘The Turinese are still very mad’, and that it would
be best to have ‘someone who could keep us up to the state of feeling in Turin ’.114
Clarendon’s eﬀort to transfer the oﬃce to Milan reﬂects his government’s out-
ward determination that the consular service was a commercial organization,
while Elliot’s insistence upon Turin is evidence of the determination of a diplomat
to employ a consul as an accessory to aid him in his own role as a correspondent
on political aﬀairs. Ultimately Colnaghi’s fully salaried consulate would remain
in Turin for more than a decade, while Thomas Kelly was appointed as an
unpaid, lower-ranking vice-consul to the more important commercial centre of
Milan in 1867.115 The despatch brieﬁng Colnaghi on his new role informed him
that once at his post Elliot ‘will furnish you with such Special Instructions as he
may think necessary’,116 further testifying to the link between diplomat and consul
in the procurement of intelligence on Italian aﬀairs.
Therefore British foreign secretaries and diplomats appear to have regarded
the gathering of intelligence as the most important aspect of the consular service’s
role in Italy during the decade following its uniﬁcation. If the creation of con-
sulates-general at Milan and Naples during the early 1860s suggests that the
service was malleable towards this end, then the rejection of requests for an oﬃce
in Florence and the subsequent creation of one in Turin rather than Milan
provide conﬁrmation. These actions might even be interpreted as part of a well-
established interventionist streak in the British relationship with Italy. The
country formed part of a strategic lifeline between Britain and its most important
imperial possessions,117 and British governments had long sought to protect it
from French ambitions. The British had sought to inﬂuence Italian aﬀairs during
the crises of 1847–9 and 1859–60, sending special envoys to Italy’s reactionary
predecessor states in the hope of encouraging reforms,118 and providing unsol-
icited advice to constitutional governments in Piedmont.119 After Italian uniﬁ-
cation this trend continued, as Liberal foreign secretaries urged the leaders of
the ﬂedgling state to concentrate on providing good domestic government
rather than pursuing international objectives.120 While Palmerston and Russell
113 Elliot to Clarendon, 21 Feb. 1866, TNA, FO 45/85.
114 Elliot to Murray, 21 Feb. 1866, TNA, FO 45/85. 115 Foreign Oﬃce list (Jan. 1870), p. 118.
116 Russell to Colnaghi, draft copy, 31 Aug. 1865, TNA, FO 45/76.
117 Ernle Bradford, Mediterranean : portrait of a sea (London, 2000), pp. 510–13.
118 See Justus B. Mugaju, ‘Anglo-Italian relations, 1846–1849: a study of British policy and attitudes
towards Italy during the revolutionary years ’ (Ph.D. thesis, Bristol, 1976) ; Evelyn Ashley, The life and
correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, II (London, 1879), p. 425; Elliot, Some revolutions,
pp. 4–5.
119 Ronald Marshall, Massimo D’Azeglio : an artist in politics, 1798–1866 (London, 1966), p. 199.
120 Among many examples, see Russell to Hudson, 21 Jan. 1861, TNA, FO 167/122 and Clarendon
to Elliot, 12 Mar. 1866, in Blakiston, ed., Il problema veneto, pp. 784–5.
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dominated foreign policy during the 1850s and early 1860s, the British govern-
ment was generally assertive and interventionist in European aﬀairs,121 and their
approval of the Uniﬁcation of Italy in 1860 showed how eﬀective they could be in
making Britain’s inﬂuence felt on the Continent. But their humiliation by
Bismarck during the Danish crisis of 1864 led to criticism of their intervention-
ism,122 and resulted in a cross-party consensus on the beneﬁts of remaining aloof
from European aﬀairs.123 Subsequent Conservative and Liberal governments
sought to abstain from continental entanglements, even if such an approach was
not enthusiastically embraced by a country used to Palmerston’s bullish style and
conscious of its wealth and power.124 However, as British foreign policy moved
oﬃcially towards isolationism from the mid-1860s, the way in which consuls were
used suggests that the Foreign Oﬃce nonetheless remained very interested
in Italian aﬀairs. The reorganization of the consular service in Italy, with its
emphasis on the gathering of intelligence rather than other functions, is more
consistent with British interventionism than isolationism. Either way, British
consular staﬀ formed an eﬀective and reliable service providing generally accu-
rate information for both the Foreign Oﬃce and their diplomatic colleagues
throughout the 1860s. At no point do they appear to have either questioned their
obligation – or shown any hesitation – to do so.
121 See Donald Southgate, ‘The most English minister … ’ The policies and politics of Palmerston (London
and New York, NY, 1966) ; M. E. Chamberlain, British foreign policy in the age of Palmerston (London,
1984) ; John Charmley, ‘Palmerston: ‘‘Artful Old Dodger’’ or ‘‘Babe of Grace’’ ? ’, in T. G. Otte, ed.,
The makers of British foreign policy : from Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke, 2002).
122 Wilbur Devereux Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian conservatism (Oxford, 1956), pp. 278–9.
123 Muriel E. Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica ’? British foreign policy, 1789–1914 (London and New York,
NY, 1988), pp. 123–7; Kenneth Bourne, The foreign policy of Victorian England (Oxford, 1970), pp. 81–123;
K. Theodore Hoppen, The mid-Victorian generation, 1846–1886 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 221–36.
124 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery (London, 2001), p. 181; Charmley,
‘Palmerston’, pp. 92–4.
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